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Abstract
This comment provides an analysis of existing legislation governing recovery for injuries
received by offshore workers and the manner in which these statutes are interpreted and applied
by the courts. Part One will examine the various types of drilling rigs employed in the development
of offshore resrouces. Parts Two and Three will enumerate the statutory bases of recovery and the
development of criteria utilized by the courts in determining the applicability of the provisions of
the Jones Act. Finally, Part Four will explore potential alternatives to existing legislation.
COMMENTS
INHERENT INEQUITIES IN AFFORDING OFFSHORE
WORKERS JONES ACT RECOVERIES:
A PLEA FOR A UNIFORM COMPENSATION SCHEME
INTRODUCTION
With the depletion of proven oil and gas reserves on land and the
inability to develop new land-based fields,' the search for new
sources of energy has shifted dramatically in recent years to offshore
development. 2  The intensified exploration and exploitation of
mineral reserves on the Continental Shelf 3 has created a hybrid
species of marine laborer. Offshore oil laborers engage in a liveli-
hood similar to that of traditional seamen in that they spend a
major portion of their lives on water.4  These workers may be
distinguished from traditional blue-water seamen, however, in that
1. It has been estimated that approximately two-thirds of all recoverable oil resources
located in the United States had been exhausted by 1975. J. LICHTBLAU & H. FRANK,
OUTLOOK FOR WORLD OIL INTO THE 2 1ST CENTURY, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PERIOD TO 1990,
4-7 (1978). Further, of the estimated 85 billion barrels of crude oil yet to be produced by the
United States, approximately 65 percent of this total will be produced offshore. Id. at 4-10.
2. Prior to 1947 there was no significant drilling in offshore regions anywhere in the
world. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, HISTORY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 67 (1961).
Today exploratory wells have been drilled in the waters of at least 90 countries and currently
there are more than 30 nations producing either oil or gas from offshore operations. Such
significant deposits of petroleum have been discovered that offshore proven crude oil r~serves
are presently estimated at 240 billion barrels, representing 37 percent of the world's esti-
mated reserve. PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T OF EXXON CORP., THE OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND
GAS 2 (4th ed. Sept. 1980).
3. The Continental Shelf may be defined as those submerged lands lying outside of a
line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of each state. Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act), 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. III 1979). See note 55 infra, for further
discussion of the boundaries of the Continental Shelf. To date over 24,600 wells have been
drilled on the Continental Shelf of the United States. THE OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND
GAS, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Questions pertaining to the status of the offshore workers and their remedies in the
event of injury are discussed in the following: Fallon, Jurisdiction Over Offshore Operations:
Foreign Seamen Claims, 15 FORUM 595 (1980); Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum
Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 TEX. L. REv. 973 (1977); Schill, Available
Forums and Recoverable Damages in Offshore Personal Injury Litigation in the Fifth Cir-
cuit: A Review and Analysis, 16 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1978); Schill, Offshore'Oil Workers-Bene-
fits and Elements of Damages, 15 FORUM 288 (1980); Vickery, Special Problems of Personal
Injury and Death Arising Out of Collision Disaster Cases, 51 TUL. L. REv. 896 (1977);
Comment: When is an Offshore Oilfield Worker a Seaman?, 27 LA. L. REV. 757 (1967).
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they are subject to an increased likelihood of serious injury by being
exposed to the hazards of drilling as well as maritime risks.5
Congress has initiated measures to ensure the safety and welfare
of offshore workers and to reduce the probability of serious injury.'
Despite these safety precautions, accidents do happen, and far
more frequently than in almost any other industry. 7 Unfortunately
for the offshore workers, the proliferation of offshore operations has
not prompted corresponding legislation designed to provide ade-
quate compensation in the event of an industrial mishap. Rather,
due to congressional passivity, the courts have assumed the unenvi-
5. "Many of the . . . seamen on these vessels share the same marine risks to which all
aboard are subject. And in many instances [these] seamen are exposed to more hazards than
are blue-water sailors. They run the risk of top-heavy drilling barges collapsing. They run all
the risks incident to oil drilling." Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959).
6. Federal jurisdiction and control over the Continental Shelf are derived from the
Lands Act which provides for federal administration of this area. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343
(1976). The Lands Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe rules and regula-
tions to govern competitive bidding for offshore leases. Id. at § 1337(a). Rules and regulations
covering such matters as the training of offshore personnel and safety procedures are promul-
gated by the United States Geological Survey. J. KITCHEN, LABOR LAW AND OsoRE OIL
36-37 (1977).
While it would appear that the rule-making power of the United States Geological Survey
was designed to be all-inclusive, there remains some overlap of federal statutes governing
activities on the Continental Shelf. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that
the provisions of that act shall apply with respect to employment performed in a workplace
on outer continental shelf lands. 29 U.S.C. § 213(f)(1976). Further, in the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, itself, is the express provision that:
The head of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall have
authority to promulgate and enforce such reasonable regulations with respect to
lights and other warning devices, safety equipment, and other matters relating to
the promotion of safety of life and property on the islands and structures . . . as he
may deem necessary.
43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (1976). Thus, while the regulation of activities on the Continental Shelf
may be thorough, it is at times confusing and inefficient. In fact, as noted by one commenta-
tor, the system for the regulation of activities on the Continental Shelf is:
[I]nordinately complicated, beset by problems of definition, problems relating to
jurisdiction, the overlapping of statutes, and the division of responsibilities for the
administration and supervision of the activities between numerous different agen-
cies with the Coast Guard, the US Geological Survey, the Corps of Engineers, and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration all having some responsibility
for safety standards and their enforcement.
J. KITCHEN, supra at 38-39.
7. Between 1955 and April 1974, there were at least sixty-eight major offshore disasters
throughout the world, involving the loss of at least 100 lives and costing approximately $198
million. J. KITCHEN, supra note 6, at 126. Moreover, twenty-nine rigs, constituting 12
percent of the world total of operational offshore rigs, were total losses. Id. The worst
offshore disaster involved the collapse of a platform located in the North Sea, in which 123
workers lost their lives. See N.Y. Times, March 28, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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able task of ascertaining which maritime principles are applicable
to offshore operations. The vacuum created by Congressional inac-
tivity has led the courts to utilize traditional maritime concepts
ill-suited for marine petroleum workers.
8
At present, offshore workers injured in the scope of their employ-
ment are limited to recovery under one of two compensatory
schemes: maritime law or workmen's compensation.9 The theory
upon which a particular offshore worker relies is dictated by the
type of structure to which he is assigned.' 0 If the injured worker is
permanently assigned to a fixed drilling installation," he may seek
recovery only under federal or state workmen's compensation
schemes which provide for a fixed schedule of payments.' 2 If the
offshore worker is injured while assigned to a movable rig' 3 he is
entitled to the more generous benefits of the Jones Act.' 4 - In es-
sence, the existing compensation program distinguishes two classes
of offshore workers-those engaging in maritime activities and
those performing duties essentially industrial in nature.
The inherent defect of this classification scheme lies in its under-
lying premise that workers on movable rigs are exposed to substan-
tially greater maritime risks and should therefore be accorded
8. As "wards of admiralty," seamen have been accorded unique rights and remedies,
among them recovery for maintenance, cure and wages and recovery for injuries sustained
due to the unseaworthiness of a vessel. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539 (1960); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
The concept of maintenance and cure imposes on the shipowner the absolute duty to furnish
a "seaman" injured while in the service of the ship with food, lodging and subsistence until
the maximum cure has been attained. The concept of negligence and fault have no applica-
tion to this ancient principle of maritime laws. Jones, Personal Injury-Offshore Oil Opera-
tions, 5 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 681, 726 (1972).
Under the seaworthiness doctrine the shipowner warrants that the "vessel" and its equip-
ment are free from defect and reasonably fit for their intended use. As with maintenance and
cure, the duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel is absolute, the breach thereof giving rise to a
species of liability without fault. Furthermore, the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel and
appurtenances is said to be non-delegable. Id.
9. See notes 49-73 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 114-31 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 30-40 infra and accompanying text.
12. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1976). The determination of whether state or federal law governs a particular accident is
made pursuant to the Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1333 (1976). That act provides that
accidents occurring within three miles of the adjacent state are subject to state law while
those beyond the three mile limit are subject to federal jurisdiction.
13. See notes 30-43 infra and accompanying text.
14. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). For a discussion of the numerous advantages of recovering
under the Jones Act, see notes 65-73 infra and accompanying text.
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greater protection.' 5 Actually, all offshore workers are subject to
the same hazards of the sea and of drilling regardless of the type of
structure being utilized at the drilling site.' Drilling operations
involving either movable rigs or fixed structures 7 are usually con-
ducted at such distance from the shore and under such extreme
weather conditions"' that effective aid from land in the event of an
emergency is an impossibility. 1 In this respect, the plight of all
offshore workers may be equated to that of imperiled seamen in
that neither group can rely on prompt help from shore but are
dependent upon ships in the immediate vicinity. 20 Both classes of
offshore workers are equally secluded and their emergencies assume
a uniquely maritime character; they both confront the dangers of
the sea.
Further examination of this classification scheme reveals that it is
founded upon maritime principles of limited application to offshore
operations. 2' Primarily, the courts reason that workers assigned to
15. The weakness of this classification scheme was first recognized by the courts in
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959). Nevertheless, the ensuing case
law disregards the warning espoused by Robison and rigidly adheres to criteria that ignore
the reality of offshore drilling. See the following cases in which offshore workers were denied
equitable coverage: Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981) (pusher);
Billings v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 618 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980) (roustabout); Kirk v. Land
& Marine Applicators, Inc., 555 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (sandblaster); In re Dearborn
Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 886 (1975)
(platform supervisor); Cox v. Otis Eng'r Corp., 474 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973) (wireline
operator); Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1012
(1973) (welder); Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co., 468 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972) (tempo-
rary helper).
16. See, e.g., In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
17. The decision whether to utilize a fixed platform or a mobile rig at a particular site is
usually made in accordance with business considerations. It also should be noted that the use
of fixed platforms in deepwater projects encounters technological limitations. The largest
fixed platform currently in use is Cognac, which is situated in 1,025 feet of water in the Gulf
of Mexico. Houston Business Journal, August 3, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
18. Offshore operations located in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, where the
greatest concentration of drilling is being conducted in United States waters, must be built to
endure winds of up to 140 miles per hour and waves more than 70 feet in height. THE
OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND GAS, supra note 2, at 12.
19. As of September 1980, offshore drilling had taken place in waters as deep as 4,900
feet and at distances more than 200 miles from shore. Id. at 2.
20. Consequently, Great Britain enacted legislation requiring that a standby vessel be
assigned to each manned installation in the North Sea in order to accelerate an emergency
rescue in the event of a serious accident. Mineral Workers Act, 1971, s.6.
21. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 8. This commentator notes that:
[flor admiralty and maritime principles of law to apply equally to 'seaman' and
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movable rigs are subject to maritime risks incident to movement at
sea.22  In fact, a movable rig operates at one drilling site for a
substantial length of time, thereby sharply curtailing the period of
navigation. 23  Thus, actual movement of drilling rigs occurs infre-
quently2 4 and only under the most favorable of conditions. 25 Conse-
quently, workers assigned to mobile rigs are exposed to minimal
danger due to movement.
One aspect of offshore drilling virtually ignored in the formula-
tion of this classification scheme is that of transportation of workers
to and from the drilling site. Workers on both movable and fixed
rigs are transported to and from shore by use of crewboats.2 6 Ham-
pered by rough seas and inclement conditions, the transfer from
platform to vessel can become an extremely dangerous maneu-
ver. 2 7  This is not to say that these passengers are necessarily sea-
men within the meaning of maritime law, 28 but rather to suggest
that universal hazards confront all offshore workers.
In sum, the different degrees of protection afforded to offshore
workers is the product of a classification scheme based on an artifi-
cial distinction. Utilization of this scheme in determining the type
of recovery available to the injured offshore worker has resulted in
'vessels,' on the one hand, and to roughnecks and other oil field workers aboard
offshore drilling rigs, on the other hand, would appear to be a most unusual
extension of admiralty and maritime law especially when it is recognized that the
typical offshore oil field worker does not carry seaman's papers, belongs to no
seaman's union and performs no seafaring duties aboard a 'vessel' in the traditional
sense.
Id. at 704.
22. See Boatel, Inc. v. Delamore, 379 F.2d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1967); Offshore Co. v.
Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1959); Sirmons v. Baxter Drilling, Inc., 239 F. Supp.
348, 349 (W.D. La. 1965); Robertson, supra note 4, at 995-96.
23. Drilling operations conducted by movable rigs require an average of 90 days for
completion. Telephone interview with Charles W. Hill, Offshore Drilling Manager, South-
eastern Division, New Orleans, La., Exxon Co., U.S.A. (Sept. 11, 1981).
24. On the average the rigs are moved four times a year but may be moved as many as six
to eight times within a year. Id. In some cases, movable rigs are required to change locations
less than once a year. See, e.g., Boatel, Inc. v. Delamore, 379 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1967).
25. Charles W. Hill, supra note 23.
26. While transportation may also be conducted by helicopter this mode is employed
infrequently in the day-to-day movement of laborers. Rather, helicopter usage is generally
limited to instances when utilization of crewboats is preempted by rough sea conditions. P.
SWAN, OCEAN OIL AND GAs DRILLING AND THE LAW 33 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975).
28. See Callahan v. Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc. 482 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1973); Nolan v.
Coating Specialists, Inc., 422 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1970); Texas Co. v. Savoie, 240 F.2d 674
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 840 (1957).
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the inequitable denial of effective recovery to fixed platform
workers. The courts, however, are not the appropriate forum for
the resolution of this dilemma.29  'Legislative action is needed to
design a compensation program which would promote the develop-
ment of offshore resources by adequately protecting all offshore
workers.
This Comment will provide an analysis of existing legislation
governing recovery for injuries received by offshore workers and
the manner in which these statutes are interpreted and applied by
the courts. Part One will examine the various types of drilling rigs
employed in the development of offshore resources. Parts Two and
Three will enumerate the statutory bases of recovery and the devel-
opment of criteria utilized by the courts in determining the applica-
bility of the provisions of the Jones Act. Finally, Part Four will
explore potential alternatives to existing legislation.
I. THE PHYSICAL NATURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING UNITS
Although there are a variety of offshore rigs designed for under-
water exploitation or exploration, all such structures may be cate-
gorized as either a movable rig or a fixed platform .30 The movable
rig is one which can travel from site to site without major disman-
tlement or modification, regardless of whether it has its own means
of locomotion. 3 1 In contrast, fixed platforms are permanently at-
tached to the ocean floor and cannot be moved.32  As noted previ-
ously, the mobility of the offshore unit determines the type of
recovery available to an offshore worker . 3
29. In Smith v. Falcon Seaboard, Inc., 463 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1085 (1972), the widow of a worker assigned to an offshore drilling platform challenged as
unconstitutional the different remedies afforded workers assigned to platforms and those
assigned to vessels, by § 1333(c) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1976). While rejecting plaintiff's claim that the "mobility of the
situs" constituted an arbitrary criterion, the court stressed that inequities that the state may
produce "can more appropriately be dealt with in the halls of Congress, where the statutory
distinction originated." 463 F.2d at 208.
30. Fallon, supra note 4, at 596; Robertson, supra note 4, at 982.
31. Cadwallader, Legal Aspects of Safety of Offshore Installations, LLOYD'S MAR. &
CoM. L.Q. 53, 53 (Feb. 1977).
32. Id.
33. See notes 12, 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
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The class of movable drilling units currently utilized in offshore
operations includes submersible3 4 and semi-submersible rigs, 35
barges, 3 jack-up rigs, 37 and drill ships. 38  Because of their mobil-
ity, all floating structures are treated as vessels. 39  Those individ-
uals who are employed permanently aboard these rigs and perform
tasks that further the object or purpose of the rig40 are considered
members of the crew, 41 and as such have access to the same legal
34. A submersible drilling rig is designed to operate in relatively shallow waters, being an
adaptation of the land based rig. The deck of the rig is supported on a number of vertical and
horizontal pontoons which are flooded when the rig is in position for drilling. E. WHITEHEAD,
AN A-Z OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS (1976) QUOTED IN M. SUMMERSKILL, OIL RIGs: LAW AND
INSURANCE 8 (1979). See, e.g., Adams v. Kelly Drilling Co., 273 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960).
35. A semi-submersible drilling rig is one which floats above the drilling site. It is
partially submerged and moored by anchors, much like a ship. M. SUMMERSEILL, OIL RIGs:
LAW AND INSURANCE 5 (1979). The semi-submersible rig is generally engaged in drilling
operations in water depths less than 2,500 feet. THE OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND GAS,
supra note 2, at 12. See, e.g., Loftis v. Southeastern Drilling, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. La.
1967).
36. Drilling barges are usually employed in in-shore waters, rivers and estuaries. M.
SUMMERSIULL, supra note 35, at 3. These units are designed to operate while afloat and
usually have no primary propelling machinery. Id. See, e.g., Landry v. Amoco Production
Co., 595 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. "A jack-up or self-elevating drilling unit is one which, after being towed, or in some
cases propelling itself, to its location, is able to lower its legs so that they rest on the seabed,
the deck then being raised above the sea level." M. SUMMERSKILL, supra note 35, at 9. The
utility of this type of rig is limited to operations in waters approximately 300 feet deep. THE
OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND GAS, supra note 2, at 9. See, e.g., Christofferson v. Hallibur-
ton Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
38. A drill ship is a vessel with an opening in the hull enabling it to engage in drilling
operation in waters as deep as 6,000 feet. THE OFFSHORE SEARCH FOR OIL AND GAS, supra note
2, at 13. See, e.g., Howard v. Global Marine, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 809, 105 Cal. Rptr. 50
(1972).
39. The cases on point have been decided primarily by the courts of the Fifth Circuit.
Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981); Kirk v. Land & Marine
Applicators, Inc., 555 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1977); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975); Dugas v. Pelican Constr. Co., 481 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1973);
Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972); Neill v. Diamond M Drilling
Co., 426 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1966); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil
Indus., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. La. 1970); McCarty v. Service Contracting, Inc., 317
F. Supp. 629 (E.D. La. 1970); Loftis v. Southeastern Drilling, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. La.
1967).
40. It has been held that anyone who contributes to the labors, operation or welfare of
the vessel (or mobile rig) furthers the mission of that vessel, even if that contribution has no
effect on the navigation of that vessel. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir.
1959). The determination of whether or not a contribution to the function or mission of the
vessel has been made is a question of fact. Id. at 778-80.
41. See note 64 injra and accompanying text.
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remedies available to the traditional blue-water seaman, 42 includ-
ing Jones Act protection. 43
An injured worker whose casualty occurs during his assignment
to a fixed platform must pursue a different avenue of recovery.
Fixed platforms have been held to be artificial islands, not ves-
sels.44  Therefore, the injured fixed platform worker is limited to
compensation benefits from his employer. 45  The determining fac-
tor as to which compensation scheme should be utilized (i.e., fed-
eral or state) is whether the platform was located within the territo-
rial waters of the adjoining state or the area covered by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 46
It is thus apparent that a worker's fortuitous assignment to a
floating rig or fixed structure and its location within or outside the
offshore waters of the United States control his potential monetary
recovery in the event of personal injury or death. The irony of this
situation is that these two classes of employees are governed by
different laws although their job descriptions and duties may be
identical. 47  Further, as noted above these two classes of workers
are subject to similar working environments, thereby exposing all
offshore workers to the same maritime risks. 48
42. See Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.
1978) and remainder of this Comment.
43. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The scope of this examination will be limited to analysis of
the Jones Act and workmen's compensation schemes. For an extensive discussion for the
remedies of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, see Jones, supra note 8 at 687-91.
See also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960) (unseaworthiness); Farrell
v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 512-19 (1949) (maintenance and cure).
44. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Shell Oil Co, 489 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1973); Callahan v.
Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc., 482 F.2d 1350, 1351 (5th Cir. 1973); Bible v. Chevron Oil Co., 460
F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 984 (1972); Bertrand v. Forest Corp., 441 F.2d
809, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
45. See Robin v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1977); Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d
577 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-1343 (1976); see notes 30-40 supra. Note that when a platform is
located within state waters, the compensation laws of the adjoining state afford the remedy,
while in those instances where the platform is located within federal waters, the employee or
his survivors are entitled to federal remedies. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1976), as amended by
the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203(b),
92 Stat. 635. The workmen's compensation schemes are analyzed in detail, see note 65 infra
and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Davis v. Hill Eng'r, Inc., 549 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1977); Ross v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1012 (1973).
48. See notes 15-29 supra and accompanying text.
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II. LEGISLATION GOVERNING ACTIVITY ON THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Following the Presidential Proclamation issued by President Tru-
man in 1945 declaring that the resources of the Continental Shelf
were property of the United States government, 4 Congress enacted
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act)50 which pro-
vides for the federal administration and control of these areas. The
Lands Act provides the basic legal framework governing offshore
drilling operations, including remedies for industrial accidents. The
Lands Act provides in pertinent part:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from
any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the
outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, devel-
oping, removing, or transporting ... the natural resources, or
involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be
payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. 51
However, an employee is defined to exclude the master or member
of the crew of any vessel or any employee of any state government
or the federal government or any of its agencies.5 2 Thus, maritime
compensation remedies are left intact for seamen engaged in opera-
tions on vessels located on the Continental Shelf.
Under this extension, Longshoremen's Act benefits5 3 became the
sole remedy available to all workers assigned to fixed platforms
located beyond three miles from shore, regardless of the situs of the
injury.5 4 However, workers on fixed platforms within three miles
from shore continued to look to state workmen's compensation as
49. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
50. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976) as amended by the Outer Continental Shelf Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 635.
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b), (c) (Supp. III 1979).
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(c)(1).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1927), as amended by the Act of October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-576 §§ 2(c), 21, 86 Stat. 1251, 1265.
54. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 432 n.ll (5th Cir. 1977)
(dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Smith v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d
1154, 1156 (5th Cir. 1975) (injury on platform) (Longshoremen's Act held applicable where
injury occurred on a platform located on the outer Continental Shelf).
1981]
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their primary injury remedy.55  The court in Olsen v. Shell Oil
Co. 5 recognized the problem inherent in this statutory scheme.
Specifically, the court noted that the Lands Act was not properly
designed to implement a system of uniform liability coverage to
protect the offshore worker; rather:
(t)here can be no question that the primary purpose for this
legislation was to assert United States jurisdiction over the shelf,
and to set up a system for the full development of its natural
resources. Protection of the workers on the platform, while no
doubt a legitimate concern of Congress, was not a motivating
force behind the legislation, and, in fact, only became relevant
if jurisdiction was asserted. Therefore, it would not be unfair to
say that protection of these workers... was 'at best a secondary
concern' of the Act. 57
Thus, Congress has left an area void of appropriate legislation
rendering fixed platform workers with inadequate liability protec-
tion.
Furthermore, while the provisions of the Lands Act dictate the
theory of recovery available to an injured offshore worker, the
Supreme Court reasoned in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 58 that the purpose of the Lands Act was to encourage explora-
tion and development of underground resources on the continent's
submerged shelf lands. The Lands Act's legislative history reflects
Congress' belief that such exploration is substantially a land-related
activity and alien to the traditional interests of maritime law.59 In
55. The Lands Act defines the shelf as all submerged lands lying outside of a line of each
state. However, the act contains a proviso that state waters may extend beyond this limit if
such boundary existed at the time the state became a member of the Union. Under this
provision, Texas is entitled to a marine boundary three leagues (10.36 geographical miles)
from shore by virtue of an historical claim recognized upon admission in 1845. United States
v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 64 (1960). Florida has a marine boundary extending three leagues
into the Gulf because of Article I of Florida's Constitution of 1868, approved by Congress
upon readmission during Reconstruction. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 127 (1960).
56. 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
57. Id. at 1188. The primary purpose of the Lands Acts was to amend the Submerged
Lands Act to permit the area in the outer Continental Shelf beyond the boundaries of the
States to be leased and developed by the Federal Government. H.R. REP,. No. 413, 8 3D
CONG., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2177.
58. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
59. Id. at 364-66. In support of this conclusion the Court quoted the testimony of an
admiralty expert given at the congressional hearings that "[m]aritime law in the strict sense
has never had to deal with the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is
ill adapted for that purpose." Id. at 365 n.12. In fact, the Senate considered the application
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sum, what Congress accomplished with passage of the Lands Act
was the creation of inadequate protection for workers on fixed
platforms while leaving intact "ill-adapted" maritime remedies for
workers on mobile rigs.60 This anomalous consequence can only be
rectified by Congressional enactment of legislation carefully tai-
lored to meet the unprecedented needs of all offshore workers. In
short, what is needed is a uniform compensation scheme applicable
to all offshore workers.
B. The Jones Act
1. Coverage and Remedies
Offshore workers permanently assigned to mobile drilling rigs
are covered by various maritime laws and principles, the most
comprehensive and advantageous being the Jones Act."' Under the
Jones Act if a seaman has sustained a personal injury or has been
killed in the course of his employment, an action for damages
against the seaman's employer62 may be brought by either the
of maritime law to offshore structures (vessels and drilling platforms) but determined that
such an approach would not adequately protect the offshore workers. 99 CONG. REC. 6963
(1953).
60. The limitations of maritime law were emphasized by Senator Cordon, who presented
the Lands Act bill to the Senate:
this [maritime] approach was not an adequate and complete answer to the problem.
The so-called social laws necessary for protection of the workers and their families
would not apply. I refer to such things as unemployment laws, industrial-accident
laws, fair-labor standard laws, and so forth. It was necessary that the protection
afforded by such laws be extended to the outer Shelf area because of the fact that
ultimately some 10,000 or more men might be employed in mineral-resource devel-
opment there.
99 CoNc. REc. 6963 (1953).
61. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The act provides in part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial
by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees
shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal
injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for
damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of
railway employees shall be applicable.
Id.
62. By the express terms of the Jones Act an employer-employee relationship is essential
to recovery. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949). Contra,
Herbert v. California Oil Co., 280 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. La. 1967), limited to its particular
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seaman or his personal representative."3 However, the statute fails
to define "seaman." Therefore, the issue of who has standing to
maintain an action under the Jones Act has been decided by the
courts.
64
The Jones Act offers numerous advantages over traditional mari-
time tort actions and all forms of workmen's compensation.65 Per-
haps the most advantageous aspect of the Jones Act is the reduced
burden of proof on the plaintiff. Claims brought under the Jones
Act are submitted to a jury and require a very low evidentiary
threshold; even marginal claims are properly left for jury determi-
nation.6 6 Further, there is no statutory limitation on recovery and
seamen are allowed, upon proving negligence, a lump sum reciv-
ery for pain and suffering, loss of past earnings, and residual dis-
ability. Another advantage of the Jones Act is that conscious pain
and suffering are recoverable items of damage in a death action.6 7
Since the principle dangers of life in offshore operations are acci-
dents involving heavy equipment, fires, explosions, or drownings, 68
facts (employee lent or rented to third party). However, the employer need not be the owner
or operator of the vessel. Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.
1972) (supervisor of operations).
63. The personal representative of a deceased seaman may pursue recovery under the
Jones Act for the benefit of the following specified class of beneficiaries: (i) the seaman's
surviving spouse and children; (ii) if there is no surviving spouse or children, the seaman's
surviving parents; (iii) if there is no surviving spouse, children, parents, an action may be
brought on behalf of the seaman's dependent next of kin. IB BENEDicr, ADMIRALITY § Ila
(1981).
64. The courts have held that the term "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act
and the term "member of the crew of a vessel" within the meaning of the Lands Act are
synonomous. Swanson v. Marra Bros. Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); McKie v. Diamond Marine
Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953).
65. An offshore worker injured in the scope of his employment, if covered by a federal or
state compensation scheme, is entitled to receive a prescheduled weekly allowance without
having to prove negligence on the part of his employer. These predetermined payments do
not take into account pain and suffering, loss of earnings and residual liability. In the event of
the death of an employee the total amount of payments are dependent upon the life expect-
ancy of the worker, the remarriage of the widow and the term of minority of any children.
Comment: When is an Offshore Oilfield Worker a Seaman?, supra note 4 at 757-58.
66. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957). See also Spinks
v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975); Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412
F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. See Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948) (recovery under
Jones Act is to include amount for pain and suffering if it is shown that decedent suffered
compensable physical injury resulting in pain and suffering).
68. See, e.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 979 (1979) (employees killed by the explosion of a water heater on drilling platform); In
re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 886
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the possibility of severe pain and suffering between injury and
death has become an important consideration in a death action
under the Jones Act.89
Another generous facet of the Jones Act is the doctrine of com-
parative negligence incorporated from the Federal Employer's Lia-
bility Acts (FELA) .70 This provision provides that contributory
negligence on the part of the injured employee "shall not bar a
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to such em-
ployee." 7' Also, under the FELA the defense of assumption of the
risk is denied "in any case where such injury or death resulted in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents,
or employees of such carrier. ' 72  And finally, any attempt by an
employer to exempt himself from liability under the FELA by any
"contract, rule, regulation, or device" is void. 73
Thus, a comparison of the benefits afforded mobile rig workers
under the Jones Act with those provided fixed platform workers
under federal and state compensation schemes reveals in the event
of injury, that mobile rig workers are in a much better position
than their counterparts on fixed platforms.
2. Legislative History and Judicial Interpretation
Analysis of the circumstances leading up to and culminating in
the passage of the Jones Act warrants the conclusion that it was
never the intention of Congress to apply maritime principles to
offshore drilling operations. It should be noted that the era of
commercial exploitation of offshore minerals had not yet com-
menced during Congress' formulation of the Jones Act.74  Rather,
(1975) (death of employee caused by explosion and fire); Neill v. Diamond M Drilling Co.,
426 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970) (motorman injured by sand-line drum); Soileau v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969) (employee drowned when crane mounted on
fixed platform fell into sea).
69. See, e.g., In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
70. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). The applicable provisions of the Federal Employers
Liability Acts have been incorporated by reference in the Jones Act and have been made part
of maritime law. See note 61 supra, Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
71. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
72. Id. § 54.
73. Id. § 55.
74. The Jones Act was enacted in 1920, while the first substantial development of
offshore minerals occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947. AMERuCAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
HISTORY OF PETROLEuM ENGINEERING, supra note 2, at 67.
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the Jones Act was designed to promote the growth and development
of the United States shipping industry.75 The public policy behind
this legislation was best expressed by Justice Story. Commenting on
the plight of maritime workers, he reasoned:
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden
sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhaust-
ing labour. They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire
habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence ....
Every act of legislation which secures their healths, increases
their comforts, and administers to their infirmities, binds them
more strongly to their country . . . . It encourages seamen to
engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at lower
wages. It .. .urges the seamen to encounter hazards in the
ship's service, from which they might otherwise be disposed to
withdraw .... 76
Moreover, the Jones Act was tailored to meet the needs of a
particular sector of the labor force: sailors. With this purpose in
mind the courts have been liberal in the application of the benefits
provided by the Jones Act.77 As emphasized by the Supreme Court
in The Arizona v. Anelich:78 "The legislation was remedial, for the
benefit and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of
admiralty. Its purpose was to enlarge that protection, not to nar-
row it."' 79  However, due to this liberal stance the courts have
extended the Jones Act in a manner never intended by its propo-
nents. 8 0
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the Jones Act was
designed solely to remedy the neglect of ocean-going sailors may be
found in the Senate hearings. As stated by Senator Vardaman, one
of the bill's supporters:
The prominent feature, the chief purpose, is to ameliorate the
condition of that class of American citizens whose inhuman
75. 52 CONG. Rc. 904 (1915).
76. Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
77. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
78. 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
79. Id. at 123.
80. Since the question of seaman status is essentially one of fact for jury resolution,
marine laborers of all descriptions have sought recovery as seamen, and juries have responded
sympathetically by enlarging the class of Jones Act seamen. See Noble Drilling Corp. v.
Smith, 412 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969) (mud pumper); Senko v.
LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) (handyman); Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand
& Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953) (common laborer).
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treatment ... has become a national disgrace .... Not only is
this legislation designed to improve the condition of the sailor,
but when this . . . bill [is] enacted into law the effect will be felt
throughout the civilized world.81
Although it appears quite clear that Congress never intended the
Jones Act to be applied to offshore petroleum workers, the courts
have stretched the ambit of the term "seaman" to include workers
assigned to movable rigs. 2 In so doing, the courts have virtually
ignored a class of workers as deserving of additional protection: the
fixed platform worker.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JONES ACT "SEAMAN"
A. The Development of the Robison Criteria
With the emergence of the offshore oil industry, courts con-
fronted the dilemma of ascertaining the applicability of the Jones
Act to this novel industry. Predictably, absent Congressional guid-
ance, the courts were divided as to the status of offshore workers.
This judicial controversy was finally settled by the Supreme Court
in Gianfala v. Texas Co.8 3  The employee in that case was a
member of a drilling crew who slept at a Texas Company oil field
camp and performed his duties aboard a submersible drilling
barge. He was killed while unloading drilling pipe onto a barge.
The defendant contended that the drilling barge was not a vessel
and that the decedent was an oil field employee whose duties were
not primarily in aid of navigation. 84 The trial court held that the
81. 52 CONG. REc. 4808 (1915). Senator Vardaman went on to state the intended effect
of the bill:
First, [to bring about] safety at sea, the protection of the life and providing comfort
for the people who patronize ships, and make the business profitable to operate
them. Second, to protect from the exactions of conscienceless greed the men who do
the work, who operate the ships, and give them larger liberty and make the
vocation more attractive to self-respecting men; to elevate the standard of man-
hood, and in that way improve the efficiency of the men ....
Id.
82. Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration
Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1966); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
83. Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 879
(1955).
84. The requirement that a Jones Act seaman participate in the navigation of the vessel
was liberally interpreted in Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
There the court reasoned "that one who does any sort of work aboard a ship in navigation is a
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decedent's status was a question of fact for the jury, and a verdict
was rendered for the plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating as
a matter of law that the decedent was not aboard a vessel primarily
to aid in navigation.8 5  The Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam
opinion which cited four cases, 86 reversed and remanded the case to
the district court with instructions to reinstate its judgment. Thus,
the Supreme Court provided the impetus to convert offshore oil
field workers into seamen.
Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion of Gianfala left some lin-
gering doubts as to coverage under the Jones Act, 87 prompting the
Court to clarify its position in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp.8
In this case, a handyman assigned to a dredge anchored to shore
was injured ashore while putting a signal lantern from the dredge
into a shed. After the lower court had set aside a jury verdict in the
plaintiff's favor for lack of evidence supporting a finding that he
was a member of the crew,89 the Supreme Court reversed.90 The
Court reasoned that although Senko had no duties connected with
'seaman' within the meaning of the Jones Act." Id. at 995. Thus, the court pointed out that
'even a cook or engineer is aiding in navigation. Id.
85. The court noted that when the accident took place, the vessel was not in navigation
and that the decedent was not aboard in the aid of navigation. Rather, "he was aboard it, not
as a member of a ship's crew but as a member of a drilling crew.., and... was certainly
not a 'seaman in being."' Gianfala, 222 F.2d at 387.
86. 350 U.S. 879 (1955). Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953) (court established three requirements for
determination of seaman status: (i) that the vessel be in navigation; (ii) that there be a more
or less permanent connection with the vessel; and (iii) that the worker be aboard primarily to
aid in navigation. The court elaborated on the third requirement stating that it is not to be
confined to those who "'hand, reef and steer,' but applies to all whose duties contribute to the
operation and welfare of the vessel." Id. at 388); Summerlin v. Massman Constr. Co., 199
F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1952) (holding that a fireman on a floating derrick is a Jones Act seaman
when on a vessel engaged in navigation); Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armao, 165 F.2d 301
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (court held a deckhand on a dredge was a
seaman reasoning that "crew includes all those who contribute to the labors about the
operation and welfare of the ship ...and ...each case presents a different situation ...
with .. .no single factor controlling." Id. at 305); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940) (holding that whether a person is a member of the crew is a
question of fact).
87. The decision was initially confusing as the Court provided little rationale for its
holding.
88. 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
89. 7 Ill. App. 2d 307, 129 N.E. 2d 454 (1955).
90. 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
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the movement of the dredge, 9' there was sufficient evidence to
support a jury determination that he was a seaman.92  On reexam-
ining the holding of Basset the Court reasoned:
Our holding there that the determination of whether an injured
person was a 'member of a crew' is to be left to the finder of fact
meant that juries have the same discretion they have in finding
negligence or any other fact. The essence of this discretion is that
a jury's decision is final if it has a reasonable basis, whether or
not the appellate court agrees with the jury's estimate.9 3
Thus, the Court reiterated that such cases present a question of fact
which is subject to the legitimate discretion of the jury.
Reviewing the Supreme Court and other relevant federal court
decisions,9 4 the Fifth Circuit in Offshore Co. v. Robison 5  at-
tempted to formulate a workable test for determining when there is
an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to the jury. Robison
was injured while working as a roughneck96 aboard a submersible
drilling rig97 resting on the sea floor. The court reasoned that it
would prove impossible to fix unvarying meanings to the terms
91. More precisely, Senko worked an eight-hour shift, ran errands on shore, was paid by
the hour, lived at home, drove back and forth each day, and brought his own meals to work.
Id. at 376 (Harlan J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 372-74. In a vigorous dissent Justice Harlan distinguished the holding of Basset
stating:
I do not. . . contend that men such as ship's cooks cannot be members of a crew
merely because their actual jobs have nothing to do with making the vessel move.
The vital distinction is that such men do contribute to the functioning of the vessel
as a vessel-as a means of transport on water. Not so Senko, whose duties had
absolutely nothing to do with the dredge in its aspects as a vessel.
Id. at 377 n.5.
93. Id. at 374.
94. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., Inc. 361 U.S. 129 (1959), holding that the test of
Jones Act remedy is whether the seaman was injured by negligence in the course of his
employment; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958) holding that the
status of a pile driver drowned while assisting in the erection of a radar tower 110 miles from
shore was a question for the determination of the jury; Perez v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc.,
160 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1958) stating that the real test of coverage under the Jones Act is
whether the claimant is more or less permanently employed aboard the vessel by her owner
in a capacity which contributes to the accomplishment of her mission.
95. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
96. The term "roughneck" is defined as a "driller's helper, a laborer in a drilling crew
who does the hard general work in the rigging and drilling of a well." Id. at 771.
97. However, the court did recognize that under the Jones Act a vessel may mean
something more than a means of transport on water. Id. at 776.
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seaman, vessel 8 and member of the crew. °9 Rather, the court
reasoned that there is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go
to the jury:
1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was assigned
permanently to a vessel (including special purpose structures not
usually employed as a means of transport by water but designed
to float on water) or performed a substantial part of his work on
the vessel; and 2Y if the capacity in which he was employed or
the duties which he performed contributed to the function of the
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or to the opera-
tion or welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance during
its movement or during anchorage for its future trips. 00
This landmark decision established broad guidelines to be used by
courts to determine if a particular case falls within the ambit of the
Jones Act. While going to great lengths to rationalize this hold-
ing,' 0 ' the court nevertheless broadened the originally narrow ap-
plication of the Jones Act. 10 2  In so doing, the court had opened the
gates to a plethora of litigation involving offshore workers.10 3
B. The Interpretation and Application of the Robison Criteria
The general criteria enunciated in Robison underwent significant
refinement and development in subsequent cases. 0 4  Early on,
courts addressed the appropriateness of directed verdicts on the
status of an offshore worker. 05 In Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDer-
mott & Co., 08 the court affirmed the use of a directed verdict in
such cases, noting that it "is the mistaken belief of so many that
merely because the status of who is a seaman may be a question of
fact . . . perforce make[s] every case one of fact for jury deci-
98. See note 16 supra.
99. 266 F.2d at 779.
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. "The absence of any legislative restriction has enabled the law to develop naturally
along with the development of unconventional vessels, such as the strange-looking specialized
watercraft designed for oil operations offshore and in the shallow coastal waters of the Gulf
of Mexico." Id. at 780.
102. See notes 72-79 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 15 & 39 supra.
104. See notes 104-62 and accompanying text.
105. See Marine Drilling Co. v. Autin, 363 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960).
106. 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960).
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sion." 07 Thus, while determination of seaman status may some-
times be a question for the jury, a court may hold that there is no
reasonable evidentiary basis to support a jury finding of seaman
status under the Jones Act. 08
The utilization of the Robison criteria enabled a variety of off-
shore workers' 09 permanently assigned"o to diverse mobile water-
craft' to recover under the provisions of the Jones Act. 12 How-
ever, it soon became evident that application of the Robison criteria
necessarily precluded the Jones Act coverage from any offshore
worker assigned to a fixed drilling platform.1 1 3  The courts have
reasoned that under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act," 4 offshore workers permanently
assigned to fixed platforms were relegated to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits." 5  While the alternative Jones Act-workmen's com-
107. Id. at 46. See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966);
Adams v. Kelly Drilling Co., 273 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960).
108. Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1966).
109. Davis v. Hill Eng'r, Inc., 549 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1977) (welder's helper); Dugas v.
Pelican Constr. Co., 481 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1973) (roustabout); McCarty v. Service Con-
tracting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. La. 1970) (derrick hand); Herbert v. California Oil
Co., 280 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. La. 1967) (employee of a catering concern); Loftis v. South-
eastern Drilling, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. La. 1967) (crane operator).
110. The permanency requirement has been interpreted as denying seaman's status to
those who come aboard a vessel for an isolated piece of work, "not to deprive a person whose
duties are truly navigational of Jones Act rights merely because he serves aboard a vessel for
only a relatively short period of time." Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624,
631 (E.D. La. 1975).
111. The meaning of the term vessel has been clarified such that an incompleted vessel
does not satisfy the requirements of the Robison criteria. Hollister v. Luke Constr. Co., 517
F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1975). The court reasoned that "[f]or there to be a seaman [for the
purposes of the Jones Act], there must be a ship. And an incompleted vessel not yet delivered
by the builder is not such a ship." Id. at 921, quoting Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,
452 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971).
112. See, e.g., Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975)
(oil storage facility); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966) (barge);
Guilbeau v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963) (submersible
drilling rig).
113. Sirmons v. Baxter Drilling, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. La. 1965). A derrickman
on platform installed on eight piles driven into the sea floor was held not to be a seaman. Id.
at 350.
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
115. Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); Longmire v. Sea
Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980); Blanchard v. Engine Gas & Compressor
Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirk v. Land & Marine Applicators, Inc., 555
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1977); Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1012 (1973); Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co., 468 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972); Boatel,
Inc. v. Delamore, 379 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1967).
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pensation recovery scheme may be operative in those instances
where one vessel or structure is involved, it proves unwieldly where
the drilling operation is assisted by a support vessel." 6 In Noble
Drilling Corp. v. Smith," 7 the employee was hired to work on a
fixed platform but was subsequently assigned to operate a mud
pump which was permanently affixed to the deck of a tender ship.
He ate and slept on the tender and spent a substantial percentage of
his working time on the tender. He was injured while aboard the
platform but the court nevertheless found him to be a seaman. 118
In contrast, in Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co. "l a worker
employed on a fixed drilling platform who ate, slept and spent his
off-duty time on a tender ship was denied Jones Act coverage.12 0
While the majority of Keener's work was performed on the drilling
platform, the court acknowledged the fact that during one hitch ' 2
he spent four days chipping paint and painting on board the ten-
der. 122 Nevertheless, the court denied seaman status, reasoning that
"it must be shown that he performed a significant part of his work
aboard the ship with at least some degree of regularity and continu-
ity." 123 The inherent defect in this reasoning lies in the fact that the
court, in stressing fine line distinctions, fails to pay sufficient atten-
tion to the reality of the situation. Keener was stationed a substan-
tial distance from shore so that daily commuting was impractical.
116. Kimble v. Noble Drilling Corp., 416 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1969); Noble Drilling Corp.
v. Smith, 412 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969).
117. 412 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969).
118. The court reasoned that Jones Act recovery is predicated on the injury taking place in
the course of employment and that the exact place of injury is not controlling. Id. at 957. The
court went on to hold that the fact Smith did not possess seaman's papers was immaterial.
Thus, "[slince a man does not become a seaman by papers alone, he should not be denied his
statutory status as a seaman merely because he is not a paper seaman." Id.
119. 468 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972).
120. Id. at 731-32. For further examples of such a holding, see Dugas v. Pelican Constr.
Co., 481 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1973); Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1012 (1973).
121. Keener's job required him to work in hitches of seven days followed by seven days off.
468 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1972).
122. These four days comprised approximately twenty to twenty-five percent of the total
period he had worked for the drilling company. Id. at 731.
123. Id. at 732. See Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972),
examining seaman status where claimant was temporarily not at sea. The court reasoned that
"[p]laintiff's status as a seaman, by reason of being an offshore oil worker on a submersible
drilling barge, was not lost because he was on temporary assignment in his employer's service
to do repair work on the vessel with the intent of returning to an offshore seaman's work." Id.
at 338-39.
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Therefore, he was totally dependent on the tender for all his basic
needs just as Smith. Moreover, Smith and Keener were exposed to
the identical maritime risks. Keener confronted these maritime risks
twenty-four hours per day for seven days at a time, a longer period
than many other Jones Act seamen must endure.12 4
This inequitable treatment of the fixed platform worker is even
more vividly illustrated in Owens v. Diamond M Drilling Co.125
Owens was employed as a member of a drilling crew on a fixed
platform and was stationed aboard a tender vessel where he lived,
ate and slept. The tender was not moored to the fixed platform but
was secured with numerous anchors and access was available by a
device known as a "widowmaker" 2  which was let down from the
drilling platform onto the deck of the tender. Owens' primary
duties were performed on the platform but he was occasionally
given miscellaneous duties on the tender and often left the platform
to fetch tools and supplies situated on the tender.12 7  One of his
miscellaneous tasks was to aid infrequently in unloading supplies
from work boats and lifting supplies from the tender to the plat-
form. The court denied Owens seaman status on the basis of the
holding in Keener. 12
Once again the court refused to recognize the gravity of the risk
to which this worker is exposed. 29  With frequent transfers be-
tween tender and platform, Owens encountered the possibility of
rough seas, a uniquely marine hazard. It was no mistake that the
ramp connecting tender and platform was referred to by the disqui-
eting term "widowmaker," as it emphasizes the danger involved in
moving from ship to platform. Nor is an argument equating the
124. See, e.g., Weiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956). The court held that an
employee on a ferryboat who slept and ate most of his meals ashore, working an eight hour
day, was a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. Id. at 312.
125. 487 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. The term "widowmaker" refers to the ramp which runs from the drilling platform to
the deck of a tender vessel. This ramp is utilized by workers to transfer supplies to and from
the tender vessel, as well as providing the workers access to the tender vessel for meals, sleep
and recreation. Id. at 75.
127. The Supreme Court has held that an employer who hires an individual to work on
the water thereby exposing him to the same hazards of marine service as those shared by all
aboard may not be permitted, merely by restricting his duties, to limit his liability to such
employee, in the event of disability or death alleged to have been caused by the negligence of
the employer, to the extent prescribed by the Longshoremen's Act. Wilkes v. Mississippi
River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953).
128. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
129. See Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
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dangers of unloading vessels at sea with the dangers of unloading
vessels at a pier persuasive. 130 A longshoreman removes cargo from
a ship only after it is docked, substantially reducing the possibility
of an accident. The irony of the Owens holding is that workers
assigned to the tender who are never required to board the platform
are exposed to substantially fewer marine and drilling hazards;
however, they are afforded substantially greater protection than
fixed platform workers in the event of an accident. 131
The view that fixed drilling platforms are akin to wharves and
piers, and thus outside the realm of maritime principles, was ad-
vanced in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 1 32  However,
there are significant differences between a wharf and a fixed drill-
ing platform. Primarily, a wharf is constructed in such fashion as to
be fixed to the adjacent shore as well as the sea floor. Fixed plat-
forms, on the other hand, are attached only to the sea floor and are
usually constructed at a substantial distance from shore. Hence,
offshore laborers are exposed to a greater likelihood of marine
related casualties while longshoremen essentially are exposed to
dangers incident to the loading and unloading of cargo. Further-
more, once an accident does occur on a fixed platform the serious-
ness is compounded by the absence of adequate aid, a factor totally
absent in the case of the longshoreman. Thus, the worker on a fixed
platform is deserving of more protection than the longshoreworker.
The logical basis for this conclusion was recognized by the court
in Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. 133 In this case
members of a labor crew for a submersible oil storage facility were
injured when the facility, due to removal of ballast, shook, tilted
and refloated on its side. Rejecting appellant's contention that the
facility was akin to a drydock13 4 or wharf the court noted that:
130. But see Billings v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 618 F.2d 1108, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that an offshore worker unloading tender vessels onto the drilling platform was
performing "classic longshoremen duties").
131. See notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
132. 395 U.S. 352 (1969). The Court reasoned that "the legislative history [of the Seas Act]
shows that accidents [which occur on fixed platforms are] ...no more under maritime
jurisdiction than accidents on a wharf located above navigable waters ... " Id. at 366.
133. 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975).
134. See, e.g., Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969), where it was held that mere floatation is not sufficient to make a
structure a vessel. Rather, the purpose for which a facility is constructed and the business in
which it is engaged are the controlling considerations in determining whether or not the
facility is a vessel. Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.), cert.
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"[t]he Round Barge was not attached to the shore and had full
exposure to the risks and hazards of the sea."1 35  The same can be
said of the fixed platform. Thus, laborers on such platforms are
similarly situated to their mobile rig counterparts and as such
should be accorded equivalent protection in the case of casualty or
death. 136
Recent court decisions have rigidly adhered to a strict interpreta-
tion and application of the Robison criteria. 37 In Kirk v. Land &
Marine Applicators, Inc.,' 38 an offshore employee who performed
duties as a sandblaster and painter on a fixed platform was denied
seaman status. Kirk ate and slept on the tender vessel which carried
some of the equipment he used in his platform sandblasting work.
He also performed various chores on the vessel, including kitchen
sweeping, cleaning and unloading the vessel in port. The court
reasoned that the unloading of the sandblasting equipment from
the tender onto the platform in the morning and the cleaning of the
equipment at the end of the work day were incidental to his duties
on the fixed platform.139  Further, the court held that the minor
chores and unloading of the vessel were equally fortuitous in na-
ture, having been occasioned by bad weather. 40  The court also
noted that defendant maintained four vessels to support platform
sandblasting work and that painters and sandblasters were not
ordinarily assigned to any specific vessel.' 4' Thus, the court rea-
soned that Kirk could not establish a permanent connection with
one vessel. 142
denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973). See also Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc.,
575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a submersible barge is not a vessel as the owner
did not intend to move this structure on a regular basis, as is done with submersible drilling
rigs); Leonard v. Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1978).
135. 512 F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1975).
136. Nevertheless, it has been held that Congress did not create an arbitrary or unreasona-
ble classification by limiting workers assigned to stationary drilling platforms on the Outer
Continental Shelf to benefits under the Longshoreman's Act while allowing employees as-
signed to vessels the more liberal and varied benefits of the law of admiralty. Smith v. Falcon
Seaboard, Inc., 463 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1972).
137. See, e.g., Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); Guidry
v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
138. 555 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at 482-83.
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The reasoning in Kirk is questionable for several reasons. First,
as the court pointed out in Porche v. Gulf Mississippi Marine
Corp.,'143 "[t]he requirement of a relatively permanent tie to a vessel
is meant to deny seaman's status to those who come aboard a vessel
for an isolated piece of work only." 144 Kirk therefore fulfilled this
permanency requirement as he was assigned to perform sandblast-
ing and painting duties for at least a fourteen day shift. 1 45 Second,
the rationale in Kirk is wholly inconsistent with the court's prior
finding in Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc. 146 Davis was employed
as a welder's helper to assist in the fabrication of pipe on a material
barge. The initial phase of the process was conducted on shore,
with the fabricated pipe being welded on the barge for transporta-
tion to a fixed platform where it would then be installed. On the
twenty-four hour trip to the fixed platform Davis performed some
chores, including the washing down of the barge in addition to his
welding duties. The barge had no living quarters or crew but rather
was towed to the installation point. Temporary sleeping quarters
were placed on the deck of the barge for the employees who were to
install the fabricated pipe at the platform. Davis was injured when
he slipped on the deck of the barge while assisting in sending a
cutting torch up to the platform. The next day Davis terminated his
employment over a wage dispute, thus limiting the period he
worked aboard the barge to two days. 147 The court granted Davis
seaman's status, reasoning that he met the permanency require-
ments as he expected to stay on the barge twenty to thirty days until
the installation job was completed. 14
In Kirk, the court distinguished the Davis holding, noting that
Davis' connection with his vessel was more substanial than was
Kirk's. The court pointed out that Davis expected to remain quar-
tered on the vessel for twenty to thirty days while Kirk was to be
quartered on his vessel for no longer than fourteen days at a
time.149 Further, the court pointed out that there was the possibil-
ity that Kirk would eventually be assigned housing on the plat-
143. 390 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975).
144. Id. at 631.
145. 555 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1977).
146. 549 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. Id. at 318-19.
148. Id. at 326-27.
149. 555 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1977).
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form. 150  The problem with the court's distinction is that it focuses
upon events that never occurred. In actuality, Kirk had been per-
forming duties at sea for over one week while Davis' tenure was less
than two days. Therefore, Kirk was subject to maritime risks some
three to four times longer than Davis yet he was denied Jones Act
coverage. 11
Perhaps more disturbing is the court's continuing reluctance to
appraise realistically the hazards confronting all offshore workers.
The court failed to recognize that an offshore installation is a
self-contained community in which artificial distinctions as to job
assignments are unrealistic. Regardless of whether an offshore
worker is assigned to a platform or a tender vessel the occupation
necessitates frequent transfers from platform to vessel for equip-
ment, food and sleep. Thus, all workers necessarily spend the
greater portion of their "hitch" on the tender vessel thereby expos-
ing all employees to the uniquely maritime hazards involving sea-
going vessels. This conclusion is evidenced by the facts of In re
Dearborn Marine Service, Inc.152  There an oil platform explosion
and fire extended to a vessel moored to the platform killing five of
twenty employees working at the platform. Whether these em-
ployees were assigned to the platform or the vessel should not be
given overriding importance in the determination of their recov-
eries. Rather, it seems obvious that when a disaster such as this
occurs at sea, all workers involved should be accorded equivalent
compensation guarantees. Simply put, exposure to similar indus-
trial and maritime risk warrants similar compensatory benefits.153
150. Id.
151. Moreover, as decided by the Fifth Circuit an employee may claim seaman status
though stationed on several vessels during the course of his or her employment. Higginbo-
than v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.
618 (1978).
152. 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974).
153. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit has yet to accept this ideal as evidenced by its recent
holding in Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980). Here, a roughneck
assigned to a fixed platform sustained injuries while aboard a tender vessel. In addition to his
duties on the platform he occasionally performed general maintenance work aboard the
tender, moved supplies to and from the drilling platform, unloaded and loaded supply boats
and fixed the pumps for the drilling operation located on the tender. Longmire was injured
when he slipped leaving a room where he had spent his entire shift stowing anchor chains
aboard the tender as the vessel weighed anchor in preparation of a move. The court denied
Longmire seaman's status reasoning his assignment to tasks aboard a tender was irregular and
fortuitous. Once again, the court fails to perceive the fact that such injury would never have
occurred but for his work on the tender. Blinded by the permanency requirement articulated
1981]
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One recent indication of the court's awareness of the inequity
that pervades compensatory schemes for offshore workers may be
found in Landry v. Amoco Production Co.154  Plaintiff was em-
ployed as a roustabout not assigned to any particular barge and her
work involved both land and water-related duties. At the time of
the accident she was removing debris from a gas injection station
situated on pilings and surrounded by an artificial island. The court
found that Landry met the Robison criteria in light of the recent
trend toward expanding the reach of seaman status.155 The novel
aspect of this case lies in the fact that Landry was injured while
jumping from one barge to another while they were secured to a
land based station. The court dismissed respondent's claim that
such barges were no more than floating drydocks emphasizing that
the site could be reached by boat only.156  Does this rationale
foreshadow the eventual elimination of the artificial distinctions
between platform and mobile rig workers? All offshore operations
necessarily involve transportation of workers to and from shore by
boat or helicopter. Thus, an expansive reading of Landry could
furnish the impetus for abandoning or radically altering the Robi-
son criteria.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH
The existing compensatory scheme is plagued by illusory distinc-
tions and inequitable principles. Rather than persist in utilizing a
seaman versus longshoreman's distinction, substantially greater
benefit could be derived from the implementation of a comprehen-
sive workmen's compensation program designed to meet the novel
needs of the offshore laborer. Mindful of the maritime risks inher-
ent in all offshore operations,157 the program should attempt to
provide substanially more protection than existing state and federal
workmen's compensation schemes but less than that of the Jones
Act. In this manner a significant amount of needless litigation
in Robison the court refused to acknowledge Longmire's predicament of being assigned to a
platform but being also required to work aboard a vessel.
154. 595 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
155. Id. at 1073-74.
156. Id. at 1073.
157. In fiscal year 1974 there were a total of 5,161 maritime personal injury cases filed in
the district courts throughout the federal system. ADMINISTRATIVE OFICE OF U.S. COURTS
ANNUAL Rsonrr A-17 (1974).
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would be circumvented, thereby promoting prompt payment of
benefits to the injured employee without excessive cost and pro-
longed court disputes.
The chief risk in drafting such legislation is that recoveries would
be unrealistically large, thus jeopardizing the economic viability of
the entire offshore industry. Those formulating the scheme should
be cognizant of the tremendous overhead costs inherent in offshore
drilling. The employer would also derive significant advantages
from properly drawn legislation. Primarily, the employer would be
able to estimate the cost of the operation more accurately and
allocate funds for industrial accidents accordingly. No longer would
the employer be subject to capricious jury findings, which threaten
the feasibility of such a fragile economic venture.
Such a statutory scheme is neither impractical nor without prece-
dent. The Oceanographic Research Vessels Act,15 excludes scien-
tific personnel aboard oceanographic research vessels from the clas-
sification of seamen thereby exempting the employer from liability
from maritime accidents. 5 9 The purpose of the Act was "to en-
courage and facilitate oceanographic research by removing certain
impediments which have been hampering the operation of research
vessels." 0 In a similar manner Congress could enact a statute to
promote the exploration and exploitation of offshore resources. In
sum, a legislative scheme focused upon the equitable and efficient
payment of compensation benefits is both prudent and in the na-
tional interest.
CONCLUSION
The unforeseen boom in offshore oil exploration manifested itself
in a legal environment ill-prepared to safeguard the health and
welfare of offshore workers. Existing maritime concepts founded
upon conventional ideas provided an unsuitable legal foundation
for this novel industry. Prompted by legislative inertia, however,
the courts assumed the burden of administering maritime remedies
to industrial accidents at sea. While some believe that the absence
of legislative constraints has enabled offshore law to develop natu-
rally' 6' in practice, significant maritime risks, common to all off-
158. 46 U.S.C. §§ 441-445 (Supp. III 1979).
159. Id. § 443.
160. Sm. REP. No. 1276, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1965).
161. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959).
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shore workers, have been disregarded. The inherent shortcomings
in the application of the Jones Act to offshore workers cannot be
rectified by an expansive reading of the recovery provisions, as this
would only tend to further expand the act to situations it was not
intended to cover. Rather, a comprehensive legislative scheme,
designed to establish just and equitable recoveries for injured off-
shore workers and encourage the development of offshore re-
sources, should be initiated.162
William W. Meier III
162. In 1897 Justice Holmes admonished the courts:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind immita-
tion of the past.
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
